21![SS 201b Syllabus (1) Extensive form games with perfect information. • Equilibria. • Zermelo’s Theorem. • The one deviation principle. • Backward induction. SS 201b Syllabus (1) Extensive form games with perfect information. • Equilibria. • Zermelo’s Theorem. • The one deviation principle. • Backward induction.](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/0ec51ad018389f9bbe15e397fc4338b7.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: people.hss.caltech.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2016-06-13 13:31:44
|
---|
22![Econ Theory:1–7 DOIs00199EDITORIAL Computation of Nash equilibria in finite games: introduction to the symposium Econ Theory:1–7 DOIs00199EDITORIAL Computation of Nash equilibria in finite games: introduction to the symposium](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/ae253a3dcc509ace58d88e9abd741f58.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.maths.lse.ac.ukLanguage: English - Date: 2009-12-04 09:49:02
|
---|
23![CSStat 260, Fall 2014: Learning in Sequential Decision Problems Lectures: Evans 334. Tuesday/Thursday 2:00-3:30. Instructor: Peter Bartlett http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/∼bartlett CSStat 260, Fall 2014: Learning in Sequential Decision Problems Lectures: Evans 334. Tuesday/Thursday 2:00-3:30. Instructor: Peter Bartlett http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/∼bartlett](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/9ee0233dfa5cf3e8f426db9e547c4ee0.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.stat.berkeley.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2014-08-28 11:49:09
|
---|
24![This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution and shar This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution and shar](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/3d112c25c3726db50623e219526cc377.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.u.arizona.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2008-12-12 12:08:28
|
---|
25![Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure∗ Jeanne Hagenbach† Fr´ed´eric Koessler‡ Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure∗ Jeanne Hagenbach† Fr´ed´eric Koessler‡](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/e5eff3b12f0deb520ee9cf83e7db293b.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www2.warwick.ac.ukLanguage: English - Date: 2014-03-12 21:34:04
|
---|
26![A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/130c6bac159452f63abf0e8dfd15ae60.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.carloalberto.orgLanguage: English - Date: 2011-09-20 08:40:48
|
---|
27![MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 1. The Spence Signaling Model Or: a model of education in which you don’t really learn anythingBut that’s not why this model MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 1. The Spence Signaling Model Or: a model of education in which you don’t really learn anythingBut that’s not why this model](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/8e90fb9bcb14592dae36bec5b92b0d37.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.econ.nyu.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2005-03-12 04:19:21
|
---|
28![Sequential Decision Making with Vector Outcomes Yossi Azar Tel Aviv University Sequential Decision Making with Vector Outcomes Yossi Azar Tel Aviv University](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/d0778da27e64375589590c1726333f42.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.ilLanguage: English - Date: 2014-01-27 09:12:14
|
---|
29![A Note on Ortega Reichert’s “A Sequential Game with Information Flow” the latest version of this paper, and related material, is at www.nu¤.ox.ac.uk/economics/people/klemperer.htm Simon Board and Paul Klemperer Nu A Note on Ortega Reichert’s “A Sequential Game with Information Flow” the latest version of this paper, and related material, is at www.nu¤.ox.ac.uk/economics/people/klemperer.htm Simon Board and Paul Klemperer Nu](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/2429ef1bd77edc36c03ed97f6e56726b.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.nuff.ox.ac.ukLanguage: English - Date: 2001-05-03 07:12:01
|
---|
30![Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available ERNESTO DAL BO´ Stanford Graduate School of Business and NBER Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available ERNESTO DAL BO´ Stanford Graduate School of Business and NBER Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/18b088da05690bdae1bb2a661d2c72dd.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: faculty.haas.berkeley.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2008-07-29 15:10:54
|
---|