Sequential game

Results: 81



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21SS 201b Syllabus (1) Extensive form games with perfect information. • Equilibria. • Zermelo’s Theorem. • The one deviation principle. • Backward induction.

SS 201b Syllabus (1) Extensive form games with perfect information. • Equilibria. • Zermelo’s Theorem. • The one deviation principle. • Backward induction.

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-06-13 13:31:44
22Econ Theory:1–7 DOIs00199EDITORIAL Computation of Nash equilibria in finite games: introduction to the symposium

Econ Theory:1–7 DOIs00199EDITORIAL Computation of Nash equilibria in finite games: introduction to the symposium

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Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2009-12-04 09:49:02
23CSStat 260, Fall 2014: Learning in Sequential Decision Problems Lectures: Evans 334. Tuesday/Thursday 2:00-3:30. Instructor: Peter Bartlett http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/∼bartlett

CSStat 260, Fall 2014: Learning in Sequential Decision Problems Lectures: Evans 334. Tuesday/Thursday 2:00-3:30. Instructor: Peter Bartlett http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/∼bartlett

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Source URL: www.stat.berkeley.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-08-28 11:49:09
24This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution and shar

This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution and shar

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Source URL: www.u.arizona.edu

Language: English - Date: 2008-12-12 12:08:28
25Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure∗ Jeanne Hagenbach† Fr´ed´eric Koessler‡

Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure∗ Jeanne Hagenbach† Fr´ed´eric Koessler‡

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Source URL: www2.warwick.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-12 21:34:04
26A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing

A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing

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Source URL: www.carloalberto.org

Language: English - Date: 2011-09-20 08:40:48
27MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 1. The Spence Signaling Model Or: a model of education in which you don’t really learn anythingBut that’s not why this model

MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 1. The Spence Signaling Model Or: a model of education in which you don’t really learn anythingBut that’s not why this model

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Source URL: www.econ.nyu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2005-03-12 04:19:21
28Sequential Decision Making with Vector Outcomes Yossi Azar Tel Aviv University

Sequential Decision Making with Vector Outcomes Yossi Azar Tel Aviv University

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Source URL: www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2014-01-27 09:12:14
29A Note on Ortega Reichert’s “A Sequential Game with Information Flow” the latest version of this paper, and related material, is at www.nu¤.ox.ac.uk/economics/people/klemperer.htm Simon Board and Paul Klemperer Nu

A Note on Ortega Reichert’s “A Sequential Game with Information Flow” the latest version of this paper, and related material, is at www.nu¤.ox.ac.uk/economics/people/klemperer.htm Simon Board and Paul Klemperer Nu

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Source URL: www.nuff.ox.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2001-05-03 07:12:01
30Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available ERNESTO DAL BO´ Stanford Graduate School of Business and NBER Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305

Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available ERNESTO DAL BO´ Stanford Graduate School of Business and NBER Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305

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Source URL: faculty.haas.berkeley.edu

Language: English - Date: 2008-07-29 15:10:54